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ABSTRACT
This Article bridges a gap in existing literature by evaluating, from an empirical
perspective, the impact of conflict among the lower courts on the Supreme Court’s
decision to grant or deny a petition for a writ of certiorari. Specifically, this Article
looks at the political ideology of the lower courts involved in a split of authority on
federal law and compares those positions to the political ideology of the Supreme
Court itself. This Article concludes that the ideological content of lower court
opinions in a conflict case impacts the Supreme Court’s certiorari decisions in a
statistically significant way, and thus sheds new light on the role lower court conflict
plays in whether the Supreme Court’s exercise of its discretion to grant cert.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long argued that ideological and political considerations affect
judicial behavior—that judges decide cases based, at least in part, on their own
personal ideological and partisan preferences rather than solely on application of
legal principles.1 Considerably less attention has been paid to the existence of an
ideological basis for how the justices of the United States Supreme Court decide
which cases to decide. The question of how the Court decides to decide is of
tremendous importance, given that it only chooses approximately 1% of the cases
presented. The conventional wisdom is that the Court’s decisions on petitions for
writs of certiorari are made based on a number of variables including, relevant to this
Article, circuit splits. But prior research on circuit splits and their effect on the
Court’s cert decisions has focused predominately on the mere existence of a split of
authority, rather than on the ideological or partisan divide that the split represents.
This Article bridges a gap in existing literature by evaluating, from an empirical
perspective, the impact of political ideology on the Supreme Court’s decision to
grant cert in cases involving splits of authority among the circuits and concludes that
political ideology impacts that decision to a greater extent than previously
recognized.
During its 2011 term, the Supreme Court considered approximately 8,000
petitions for a writ of certiorari.2 As the primary (and nearly exclusive) method by
which the Supreme Court selects the cases it will decide, the writ of certiorari
reflects the discretionary nature of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.3 The Court is
not required to hear all cases in which a petition for a writ of certiorari is filed;
instead, it chooses at its discretion whether to grant or deny the petition. In recent
1

Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Current Caseload: A Question of
Law or Politics?, 119 YALE L.J. 99, 102-03 (2010) (“Many hard-core political scientists are
satisfied to describe judges as nothing more than politicians in robes who do nothing more
than maximize their policy preferences.”).
2

Official data are not yet publicly available. This approximation is based on the number
of petitions considered by the Court in the prior two terms. The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV.
411, 413 (2010) (during its 2009 term, the Court considered 8,131 petitions for a writ of
certiorari); The Statistics, 125 HARV. L. REV. 362, 369 (2011) [hereinafter Statistics 2011]
(during its 2010 term, the Court considered 7,868 petitions for a writ of certiorari).
3

SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.”).
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terms, the Court has granted certiorari and issued a full decision on the merits in less
than one-hundred cases per term.4
Among these approximately 8,000 certiorari petitions were numerous petitions
claiming a conflict in the interpretation of federal law.5 The term “conflict” signals
that at least two courts have adopted differing legal rules to be applied to the same or
similar facts.6 Conflict has long been considered one of the primary reasons for
granting certiorari because conflict “offends the principle that, under one national
law, people who are similarly situated should be treated similarly.”7 Historically, the
Court was able to resolve almost all of the conflicts presented to it.8 But, as the
Court’s caseload has increased over time, its ability to resolve all conflicts has
diminished.9 Given this workload constraint, how does the Court determine which
conflicts to address and which to ignore?
We approach this research question from a policy-based perspective, adopting
the view that ideological and political considerations affect judicial behavior—that
judges “decide to decide”10 cases based, at least in part, on their own personal
ideological and policy preferences rather than solely on the application of legal
principles.11 We argue that the Court is more likely to grant certiorari in conflict
cases that reflect a difference of opinion among the lower courts over policy choices.
While existing research has pointed to the importance of policy considerations in the

4
See Statistics 2011, supra note 2, at 370 (showing that during its 2010 term, the Court
issued full, written opinions in eighty cases); see also Adam Liptak, The Case of the
Plummeting Supreme Court Docket, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, at A18.
5
In his study of the certiorari process, one scholar found that a conflict was claimed in
approximately 50% of the certiorari petitions filed with the Court. S. Sidney Ulmer, The
Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 901, 905 (1984).
6
Perhaps the most common occurrence of conflict is reflected by the term “circuit
split”—a conflict between two or more federal courts of appeals. However, conflict also may
come in several other forms: (i) conflict between one or more lower federal courts and
Supreme Court precedent; (ii) conflict between one or more federal courts and one or more
state courts (usually state supreme courts); (iii) conflict between one or more state courts and
Supreme Court precedent; and (iv) conflict between two or more state courts (usually state
supreme courts). For reasons discussed below, this paper focuses on conflict between two or
more federal courts of appeals.
7
Michael S. Shenberg, Identification, Tolerability, and Resolution of Intercircuit
Conflicts: Reexamining Professor Feeney’s Study of Conflicts in Federal Law, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1007, 1020-21 (1984). But see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV.
1567 (2008).
8
Robert L. Stern, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. REV. 465, 465
(1953).
9

Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. MacFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1404-07 (1987).
10

See generally H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT (1991).
11

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Court’s certiorari behavior,12 it has not considered how these policy considerations
play a role in conflict cases. In studying the role conflict plays in the Court’s
certiorari decision, the focus has been on the mere existence of the conflict, rather
than on the ideological divide the conflict may represent.
Answering our research question is important for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is the implications it raises for the Court’s role in our legal and
political system. It has long been argued that one of the main functions of the Court
is unify the interpretation of federal law.13 But, when the Court fails to address
conflict, the law remains unclear14 and a better understanding of the Court’s reasons
for doing so enables scholars, practitioners, and the public at large to understand the
role the Court sees for itself. If, for example, the Court’s certiorari decisions in
conflict cases reflect a concern over policy, it may suggest that the Court views itself
more as a national policy maker than as a supervisor policing non-uniformity in the
lower courts.
What might a “policy conflict” look like? Consider National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,15 in which the Court resolved a well-publicized
split among the federal courts of appeals16 on the constitutionality of the individual
health insurance mandate contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.17 News reports on the decisions from the various federal court judges
addressing the law highlighted the perceived ideology of these judges in reaching
their decisions. Newspapers were quick to identify judges appointed by Democratic
presidents who upheld the law and judges appointed by Republican presidents who
overturned the law,18 implying, if not suggesting outright, that the political ideology
12
See e.g. Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The
Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. POL. 1062 (2009).
13

Ulmer, supra note 5, at 902 n.3.

14

Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1223 (2012).
15

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

16

Compare Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding
mandate), and Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding mandate), with
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (overturning
mandate).
17

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).

18

Reporting on the early federal trial court decisions, The New York Times noted:

The ruling by Judge Vinson, a senior judge who was appointed by President Ronald
Reagan, solidified the divide in the health litigation among judges named by
Republicans and those named by Democrats. In December, Judge Henry E. Hudson of
Federal District Court in Richmond, Va., who was appointed by President George W.
Bush, became the first to invalidate the insurance mandate. Two other federal judges
named by President Bill Clinton, a Democrat, have upheld the law.
Kevin Sack, Federal Judge Rules that Health Law Violates Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2011, at A1. News reports on the later decisions reached by the U.S. Court of Appeals
continued the trend–reporting, for example, on the fact that the Eleventh Circuit had
overturned the law in an opinion written by a judge appointed by George H.W. Bush. Michael
Cooper, Health Law is Dealt Blow by a Court on Mandate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, at
A11.
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of the judge, or at least of the president who appointed him or her, explained the
particular judge’s decision. This framing of the conflicting opinions in the federal
courts by the media highlights the ideological divide that we view as representing a
“policy conflict.”
This Article offers an initial exploration of the role of policy conflicts in the
Supreme Court’s certiorari decision. We do so by comparing the policy implications
raised by cases involving conflicts among the United States Courts of Appeals in
which the Supreme Court has either granted or denied certiorari. Part II begins the
discussion by describing the relationship between conflict and the petition for writ of
certiorari. Part III reviews prior research on certiorari behavior, focusing primarily
on the role of conflict and policy preferences. From this review, Part IV suggests a
different approach to the study of the role of conflict in the Court’s certiorari
behavior, and using data collected from lower court cases, tests the theory that the
ideological divide that the conflict represents affects the Court’s decision to hear a
particular case. Part V concludes by summarizing the results of this first look,
acknowledging the limitations of this approach, and suggesting further research to
test the theory.
II. BACKGROUND
The process by which appellate cases make their way to the Supreme Court has
evolved dramatically over time. While Article III, Section 1 of the United States
Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States in “one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish,”19 it is Article III, Section 2 that is the genesis of this evolution—an
evolution that has seen the Court move from mandatory appellate jurisdiction to
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
A. The Writ of Certiorari and the Development of Discretion
Article III, Section 2 defines the judicial power—delineating the cases and
controversies over which the federal courts have jurisdiction. In addition, section 2
broadly outlines the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction with respect
to these cases and controversies and grants to Congress the authority to regulate, and
make exceptions to, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.20 Congress first exercised its
Article III powers in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created thirteen district
courts21 and three circuit courts,22 and defined a six-member Supreme Court.23 The
19

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

20

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. “[A]cts of Congress specifying the Court’s [appellate]
jurisdiction have long been understood as exercises of this power, implicitly excepting all
cases not specified.” Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections SeventyFive Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649 (2000).
21

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 10, § 2, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).

22

Id. at § 4.

23
Id. at § 1; see also Russell R. Wheeler & Cynthia Harrison, Creating the Federal
Judicial
System,
FED.
JUDICIAL
CTR.
4-7
(2005),
http://www.fjc.gov
/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/creat3ed.pdf/$File/creat3ed.pdf. The Court was expanded to seven
members in 1807, then to nine in 1837, and to ten in 1863, before finally settling at nine with
the Circuit Judge Act of 1869. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS
OF THE SUPREME COURT 34, 48, 72 (1928).
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Act conferred upon the Supreme Court original (and, in some cases, exclusive)
jurisdiction over certain matters,24 as well as appellate jurisdiction over specified
cases from both the federal and the state courts.25 Appeals to the Supreme Court
were as of right; the Court had no power to accept or decline any particular case that
came before it.26 And although the 1789 Act gave the Court the power to issue writs
of certiorari,27 that power was not a mechanism to assert jurisdiction and “did not
provide the Supreme Court with discretionary control over its jurisdiction.”28
Congress’s first grant of discretionary docket control to the Court came over onehundred years later with the passage of the Evarts Act of 1891.29 Enacted largely to
reduce the Supreme Court’s swelling case load,30 the act created nine new circuit
courts of appeal and transferred much of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to these
new courts.31 The Court maintained mandatory appellate jurisdiction over many of
the cases decided by these courts, but was given discretionary appellate jurisdiction
over cases otherwise deemed final in these Courts. This discretionary jurisdiction
was to be exercised through the use of a writ of certiorari.32
24

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 10, § 13, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).

25

Id.; see also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 13.

26
See Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2011); see also Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1649 (“[T]he Supreme
Court had no power to pick and choose which cases to decide.”).
27
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 10, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); see also Hartnett, supra note 20,
at 1650; Watts, supra note 26, at 9.
28
Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1650; see also Watts, supra note 26, at 7 (“At its inception,
the Court’s jurisdiction was not discretionary. Rather, the Court initially stood as a court of
obligatory jurisdiction that felt it had ‘no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.’” (quoting Cohens v. Virginia 19 U.S.
264, 404 (1821))).
29

Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).

30

See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 98-112; see also Mary Garvey Algero, A
Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of
Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. REV. 605, 611 (2003); Watts, supra note 26,
at 10-11; Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1650 (“[T]he number of cases that the Court was
obligated to decide grew dramatically after the Civil War . . . By 1888, the Court was more
than three years behind in its work . . . .”).
31

Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).

32

[T]he Act provided:

[T]hat in any such case as is hereinbefore made final in the circuit court of appeals it
shall be competent for the Supreme Court to require, by certiorari or otherwise, any
such case to be certified to the Supreme Court for its review and determination with
the same power and authority in the case as if it had been carried by appeal or writ of
error to the Supreme Court.
Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (1979)
(quoting Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826 (1891)). This discretionary grant of
jurisdiction was driven by Congress’s concern about divergent views of law emerging from
the newly created circuit courts of appeal. Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1651-56. See discussion
infra notes 38-60 and accompanying text.
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Congress’s largest expansion of the Supreme Court’s power to dictate its own
appellate docket came in the Judges’ Bill of 1925.33 Promoted by the justices
themselves as a way to manage the Court’s growing workload, the bill eliminated
numerous categories of cases for which Supreme Court review was mandatory and
instead made these cases reviewable via a writ of certiorari.34 With the passage of
the Judges’ Bill, the Court effectively “achieved absolute and arbitrary discretion
over the bulk of its docket.”35 Over the next sixty years, Congress granted more and
more discretionary jurisdiction to the Court until legislation enacted in 1988
eliminated all but a handful of cases from the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction.36
B. The Tie Between Certiorari and Conflict
With the creation of the nine original circuit courts by the Evarts Act of 1891,37
came the ability of those courts to be divided on issues and the need to resolve such
conflicts.38 It was this concern that formed the basis of Congress’ initial grant of
33

Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (1925). The 1925 Act followed smaller
expansions of the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction that occurred in 1914 and 1916. See
Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1657-58.
34

See Watts, supra note 26, at 13. Prior to this Act, the Court was required by law to
review cases involving “suits by the United States, suits based on federal statutes or treaties,
postal law cases, private antitrust suits, Civil Rights Act damage actions, and commerce law
suits not covered by the direct review provisions.” Linzer, supra note 32, at 1240. For an
interesting discussion of the politics behind the passage of the Judges’ Bill, see Jeremy
Buchman, Judicial Lobbying and the Politics of Judicial Structure: An Examination of the
Judiciary Act of 1925, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 1 (2003) and Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1660-1704.
35

Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1705.

36

Robert L. Stern, Eugene Gressman & Stephen M. Shapiro, Epitaph for Mandatory
Jurisdiction, APPELLATE.NET (Dec. 1988), http://www.appellate.net/articles/epitaph.asp.
37

Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 10, § 2, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).

38

At one time or another, [for example],

Courts of appeals have held that 1) under federal law, a bank robber who perpetrates a
kidnapping while robbing a national bank commits one offense (U.S. v. Faleafine,
[492 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1974)]) and commits two offenses (Clark v. U.S., [381 F.2d 230
(10th Cir. 1960)]); 2) under the Internal Revenue Code, the legal expenses of a
corporate liquidation are deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense
(U.S. v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., [365 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1966)]) and not
deductible (Lanrao Inc. v. U.S., [422 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1970)]); and 3) conviction for
making a threat against the President of the United States requires proof that the
defendant intended to carry out the threat (U.S. v. Patillo, [431 F.2d 293 (4th Cir.
1970)]) and does not require such proof (Watts v. U.S., [402 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir.
1968)]).
As long as they are allowed to stand, such conflicts mean, inter alia, that
the robber of a national bank is in less jeopardy in one circuit than in
another; that the United States Tax Court, whose decisions are appealable
to the Courts of Appeals, would have to grant a deduction in one circuit
but not in another; and that it is safer to threaten the President in one
circuit than in another. When it is recognized that such conflicts are
multiplied many times across the circuits and that they can exist for many
years, the complexity of the problem is easily appreciated.
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discretionary jurisdiction to the Court. Conflicts among the new circuit courts of
appeals were not desired and Congress sought a mechanism to resolve these
potential conflicts. The primary method of resolution of these conflicts was
certification by the circuit courts of appeals.39 The secondary method of resolution
was a petition for a writ of certiorari from the Court, ostensibly to be used in
instances in which the circuit courts of appeals failed to certify. Defending this dual
approach, Senator William M. Evarts, the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee
at the time the Evarts Act was passed, argued, “there should be something besides a
mere judgment within [the circuit courts of appeals] as to what ought to be reviewed
in the interest of jurisprudence and uniformity of decision” and that certiorari would
serve as “another guard against the occurring diversity of judgments” by the circuit
courts of appeals.40
As the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction grew, the focus on conflict remained. As
they testified before the relevant congressional committees on the bill that would
eventually become the Judges Act of 1925, the justices repeatedly emphasized the
importance of conflict in their certiorari decisions—even implying that the presence
of conflict would lead to a grant of the certiorari petition. Testifying to the House
Judiciary Committee in 1922, for example, Chief Justice Taft noted “[w]henever a
petition for certiorari presents a question on which one circuit court of appeals
differs from another, then we let the case come into our court as a matter of
course.”41
After the enactment of the Judges’ Bill this emphasis found its way into the
Court’s certiorari practice. Supreme Court Rule 35(5), adopted in 1925, stated that
Ulmer, supra note 5, at 902 (footnote omitted).
39
As passed in the House, the bill (H.R. 9014) required the circuit courts of appeals to
certify to the Court any “question that had been decided differently in another circuit court.”
Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1651; see also Linzer, supra note 32, at 1234. The requirement for
certification was removed in the Senate substitute that eventually became the Evarts Act of
1891. Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1652; Linzer, supra note 32, at 1234-35. Thus, as enacted,
the bill merely authorized the circuit courts of appeals, at their discretion, to certify questions
to the Court. Linzer, supra note 32, at 1233.
40

Linzer, supra note 32, at 1235. “[C]ertiorari was envisioned as a sort of fallback
provision should the circuit courts of appeals, prove, on occasion, to be surprisingly careless
in deciding cases or issuing certificates.” Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1656.
41

Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1665 (quoting Chief Justice Taft). Echoing Taft’s statement
in more detail in his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1924, Justice Van
Devanter explained:
The inquiry is, first, whether or not the case is one in which a petition for certiorari
will lie at all; next, whether the questions presented in the case are of wide or public
importance or concern only the parties to the particular case; next, whether there is
any conflict between the decision that is complained of and decisions on the same
question in other circuit courts of appeal or in the Supreme Court; and next, if any of
the questions determined by the circuit court of appeals be questions of State law,
whether or not there is a conflict between the decision of that court thereon and the
decisions of the court of last resort in the State on the same questions. Whenever we
find such a conflict that, without more, leads to the granting of the petition, if the case
be one in which a petition for certiorari will lie.
Id. at 1677 (quoting Justice Van Devanter) (emphasis added).
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the Court would consider conflicts among the circuit courts of appeals in
determining whether to exercise its newly granted discretionary jurisdiction.42
Importantly, and in seeming contrast to the earlier congressional testimony, the new
rules emphasized the discretionary nature of the writ—even when such a conflict
was present.43 Since that time, conflict among the courts of appeals has been a stated
consideration of the Court in deciding whether to exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction. Supreme Court Rule 10, the modern day successor to Rule 35(5),
provides:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for
compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor fully
measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the
Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with
the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same
important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of
this Court's supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in
a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort
or of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled
by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly
stated rule of law.44
C. Conflict, the Uniformity of Federal Law, and the Certiorari Decision
Although the tie between the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction and conflict first
occurred in 1891, uniformity of federal law45 has been a priority since the ratification
of the Constitution.46 “A significant purpose of Article III . . . to permit the Supreme
42

SUP. CT. R. 35(5), 266 U.S. 645 (1925) (repealed 1939).

43

Rule 35(5) provided that “review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion,” and that “while neither controlling nor fully measuring the
[C]ourt’s discretion,” the Court would consider conflict among the circuit courts of appeals in
making its certiorari decision. Id.
44

SUP. CT. R. 10.

45

In contrast, conflict in the interpretation of state law is a natural (and often celebrated)
by-product of our federal system of government.
46

Algero, supra note 30, at 618.
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Court to unify federal law by reviewing state court decisions of federal questions.”47
The uniform interpretation of federal law was, in part, the basis for the Court’s
holding in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee48 that the Court has the power to review and
overturn a state supreme court’s interpretation of federal law. The Court stressed
“the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole
United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution.”49
The historical concern for uniformity has been viewed as a way to promote
similar treatment of similarly situated litigants and as way to promote efficiency in
the legal system. Conflict “offends the principle that, under one national law, people
who are similarly situated should be treated similarly.”50 Yet, one of the key
components of our common law system is to apply the same legal rule to the same or
similar facts. If federal law means one thing in Pennsylvania and a different thing in
Kansas, the potential for disparate and potentially unfair treatment arises. Moreover,
a “large number of unresolved conflicts impedes the smooth and consistent
functioning of our justice system.”51 The uncertainty and incoherence of a nonuniform federal law, however, invited relitigation of previously decided issues,
“weakens the theory of one national law,” and “attract[s] strategic and inefficient
litigation.”52
Given the connection between conflict and the development of the Court’s
discretionary jurisdiction and the desire for uniform federal law, it stands to reason
that the Supreme Court would be more likely to grant certiorari to those cases
presenting a conflict. Available data supports this view. During the 1983-1985 terms
of the Court, approximately 45% of the cases heard from the courts of appeals
involved a conflict.53 That percentage increased to almost 69% during the 1993–
1995 terms,54 and then dropped to approximately 60% during the 2003–2005 terms.55
In addition, both qualitative56 and quantitative57 research on the Court’s certiorari

47

RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 509 (5th ed. 2003).
48
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). The United States Supreme Court
reversed a ruling of the Virginia Supreme Court regarding a land ownership dispute. The
Virginia Supreme Court refused to adhere to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling. In
response, the United States Supreme Court affirmed its power to review state supreme court
cases.
49

Id. at 347-48.

50

Shenberg, supra note 7, at 1020-21. But see Frost, supra note 7, at 1567.

51

Baker & MacFarland, supra note 9, at 1407.

52

Id.

53

Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
403, 416 (1996).
54

Id.

55

David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 983 (2007).
56

PERRY, supra note 10.
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behavior highlight the important role of conflict. Perhaps, then, it is no surprise to
note that “[a]mong the orthodox justifications for Supreme Court review, the most
firmly established is the intercircuit conflict.”58
This information, however, does not paint a complete picture. The data
highlights the number of conflict cases the Court resolved, but does not provide
information on the number of conflict cases the Court left unresolved. In fact, over
the past forty years, it is these unresolved conflicts that have been of most concern to
scholars.59 Existing research confirms the important role of conflict, but does not
clearly explain why the Court grants certiorari in some conflict cases, but denies
certiorari in others. In fact, “departures from the uniformity of law principle have
become more frequent, as has the Supreme Court’s failure to correct or eliminate
such conflicts.”60
Clearly, the existence of conflict positively impacts the Supreme Court’s decision
to grant certiorari. But, it remains uncertain how the Court chooses which conflicts
to resolve and which to ignore.
III. STUDYING CERTIORARI BEHAVIOR FROM AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE
Thus far, we have made clear the extraordinary discretion the Court possesses
with respect to the certiorari process and the key role conflict plays in that process.
How the Court exercises its discretion is a question that has fascinated scholars since
1925. While the theoretical emphasis has varied between legal61 and extra-legal62
57

Ulmer, supra note 5; Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and
Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988); Black &
Owens, supra note 12, at 1062.
58
Arthur D. Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A Preliminary Inquiry, 60
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 1014 (1985).
59

Early treatises on Supreme Court jurisdiction suggested that, in the presence of conflict,
the Court granted certiorari as a matter of course. Stern, supra note 8, at 465. As the Supreme
Court’s caseload increased over time, however, the Court’s ability to resolve [grant certiorari
to] all cases presenting conflict dwindled. Baker & MacFarland, supra note 9, at 1407. By
the mid-1970s, two different national commissions had recommended the formation of a
National Court of Appeals with the authority to resolve intercircuit conflicts. For a summary
of these proposals, as well as other historical proposals designed to promote the uniformity of
federal law, see Algero, supra note 30, at 623-34. Writing in 1984, then Associate Justice
William H. Rehnquist opined that:
[t]he Court cannot review a sufficiently significant portion of the decisions of any
federal court of appeals to maintain the supervisory authority that it maintained over
the federal courts fifty years ago; it simply is not able or willing, given the other
constraints upon its time, to review all the decisions that result in a conflict in the
applicability of federal law.
Willliam H. Rehnquist, A Plea for Help: Solutions to Serious Problems Currently
Experienced by the Federal Judicial System, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1984).
60

Ulmer, supra note 5, at 911.

61

The legal model asserts that, “in one form or another, [judicial behavior is] substantially
influenced by the facts of the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the
Constitution, the intent of the Framers, and/or precedent.” JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 48 (2002).
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explanations of judicial behavior, two general answers to this question have been
offered—one focusing on cues readily available to the Court, the other focusing on
ideological disagreement between the Court and the lower court that issued the
decision being considered for review.
A. The Development of Cue Theory
Early studies attempted to trace, without much success, the Court’s application of
its own rules for exercising its discretion.63 Although the rules claimed to highlight
the factors the Court would consider in making its certiorari decision, there were
“[d]isturbing instances . . . in which the Court’s action in granting certiorari appears
irreconcilable either with its own professed grounds or with any general canons
which can independently be formulated.”64 Indeed, it appeared that the Court’s own
rules provided “no standard whatsoever” to its certiorari decisions.65 Convinced that
the Court’s rules (including those focusing on conflict) offered little explanation for
its behavior, scholars began to test other explanations of the Court’s certiorari
decision.
Cue theory, developed in 1963 by political scientist Joseph Tanenhaus and his
colleagues, was one of the first attempts to generate a more complete picture of the
Court’s certiorari behavior.66 Given the assumption that justices can give each
certiorari petition no more than an initial cursory review, justices need a quick and
efficient method to help them separate frivolous from non-frivolous certiorari
petitions.67 The non-frivolous petitions would not necessarily be granted review, but
they would be set aside for more “careful study.”68 Thus, under cue theory, certiorari
petitions contain “readily identifiable cues” to enable a justice to perform the initial
cursory review; petitions devoid of cues could be ignored and denied review, while
petitions containing cues could be set aside for further review.69 Relevant cues

62

Extra-legal models of judicial behavior emphasize the role of ideological attitudes (i.e.
preferences over policy) and values. Judicial behavior “can be explained primarily as
expressions of their personal policy preferences, with little or no role for law, legal reasoning,
or legal doctrine.” Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical
Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV. 79, 81 (2010).
63
See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at
October Term, 1933, 48 HARV. L. REV. 238, 275-76 (1934) (evaluating certiorari grants and
denials from the 1933 term, and advocating that the Court issue opinions explaining its
certiorari decisions to “render[] the grounds of its action discoverable and predictable” and
“[to] make familiar the canons which guide the Court”); Fowler V. Harper & Arnold
Leibowitz, What the Supreme Court did not do During the 1952 Term, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 427
(1954).
64

Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 63, at 276.

65

Harper & Leibowitz, supra note 63, at 456.

66

Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 111 (Glendon A. Schubert ed., 1963).
67

Stuart H. Teger & Douglas Kosinski, The Cue Theory of Supreme Court Certiorari
Jurisdiction: A Reconsideration, 42 J. POL. 834, 835 (1980).
68

Tanenhaus et al., supra note 66, at 118.
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included the parties to the case (specifically the federal government as a party),
dissension in the case under review (specifically among the judges of the lower court
or between two or more courts or administrative agencies in the same case), and the
issue raised by the case (specifically civil liberties or economic issues).70 Data
analysis found support for the influence of all of these cues except for economic
issues.71
As originally envisioned, the purpose of cue theory was to move beyond a study
of the legal rules the Court purported to use in its certiorari process.72 Later scholars
disagreed with this approach and began to reincorporate the Court’s rules into their
analysis of the Court’s certiorari behavior, arguing that factors like conflict were too
important to ignore. The first systematic effort to this end was undertaken by
political scientist S. Sidney Ulmer in the early 1980s.73 Ulmer examined a sample of
certiorari petitions during the 1947-1976 terms of the Court (encompassing all or
part of the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts) and coded these petitions for the
presence of traditional cues identified by cue theory, as well as the presence of
conflict. To determine whether conflict was present, Ulmer identified the cases in
his sample in which a conflict was claimed to exist and independently evaluated the
cases cited therein in order to determine whether the claimed conflict was genuine.74
Statistical analysis confirmed that “conflict is far and away the most significant
predictor of certiorari decisions” for two of the three Courts evaluated.75 Ultimately,
Ulmer concluded that “[t]he Court is significantly responsive to the legal-systemic

69
Id. But see Teger & Kosinski, supra, note 67 at 845 (questioning the validity of the cue
theory, noting that it “ends up saying [merely] that the Justices tend to accept cases that they
think are important”); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Decision to Deny or Grant Certiorari: Further
Consideration of Cue Theory, 6 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 637, 642 (1972) (noting that “our analysis
led us to reject two of the three cues suggested by earlier work” and suggesting that “[a]
search for and the testing of additional cues now seems in order”).
70

Tanenhaus et al., supra, note 66 at 122-27; see also PERRY, supra, note 10, at 114-16.

71

Tanenhaus et al., supra, note 66, at 122-27. And even economic issues “didn’t do too
badly” as a cue. Teger & Kosinski, supra note 67, at 837; see also Virginia C. Armstrong &
Charles A. Johnson, Certiorari Decisions by the Warren & Burger Courts: Is Cue Theory
Time Bound?, 15 POLITY 141 (1982) (applying cue theory to the Warren Court and the Burger
Court).
72

Tanenhaus et al., supra note 66, at 114-16.

73

S. Sidney Ulmer, Conflict with Supreme Court Precedent and the Granting of Plenary
Review, 45 J. POL. 474, 474-75 (1983); accord Ulmer, supra note 5, at 903 (“I wish to know
not just how many conflict cases are granted or denied certiorari, but whether such decisions
are associated with the presence and absence of the conflict condition.”).
74

See Ulmer, supra note 5, at 904-05.

75

Ulmer’s results varied significantly across the three Courts he studied. For the Vinson
and Warren Courts, the presence of conflict explained from four to eight times as much of the
variance in the decision to grant or deny certiorari as did cues such as federal government as a
party or the presence of either a civil liberties or economic issue. For the Burger Court,
however, the presence of the federal government as a party explained as much (in all cases of
conflict) or more (in cases of intercircuit conflict only) of the variance in the certiorari
decision as did the presence of conflict. Id. at 908-10.
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variable—conflict—and less governed by case issue variables than one might have
thought.”76
More recent research is consistent with this conclusion, finding that “[w]henever
actual conflict was present, the likelihood that certiorari was granted jumped
dramatically.77 Thus, in a study of the Court’s 1982 term certiorari behavior, the
presence of a conflict78 had a statistically significant effect on the Court’s cert
decision, increasing the chances of a cert grant by 33%.79 Interviews with Supreme
Court justices and former clerks have suggested that conflict among the federal
courts of appeals is perhaps the “single most important” factor in a justice’s
certiorari decision.80
B. A Focus on Ideology
Despite the relative success of cue theory in explaining the Court’s certiorari
behavior, dissatisfaction with its ability to accurately predict the Court’s appellate
docket remained.81 While some of this dissatisfaction was due to the fact that cue
theory did not actually predict which cases would be granted certiorari,82 much of it
was due to cue theory’s failure to consider other potentially significant influences on
judicial behavior. Among most important of these considerations was impact of
ideology.
At its simplest level, a role for ideology can be found in what scholars have
labeled error-correction strategy. “[P]olicy motivated judges . . . vote to grant
certiorari whenever a lower court decision depart[s] significantly from their
preferred doctrinal position.”83 Justices following this strategy will examine
petitions to determine if the lower court issued a decision in contrast with the
justice’s personal policy preferences.84 Thus, a conservative justice will be more
likely to vote to grant certiorari to cases decided liberally below; a liberal justice will
76

Id. at 910.

77

Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1120 (1988).
78
For this study, the researchers broadly defined conflict to mean conflict between state
supreme courts, between federal courts of appeals, between a lower court and Supreme Court
precedent, or between a state court and a federal court. Caldeira & Wright, supra note 77, at
1117.
79

Id. at 1121.

80

PERRY, supra note 10.

81

Caldeira & Wright, supra note 77, at 1115.

82

The initial tests of cue theory focused only on behavior of the Court in its decision to
grant or deny certiorari. Tanenhaus et al., supra note 66, 119-20. But this is only an indirect
test of the theory. A direct test of cue theory would require observation of an individual
justice’s initial review of certiorari (i.e. the separation of frivolous from non-frivolous
petitions). Short of that, the indirect test of cue theory suggests that cases devoid of cues will
not be granted certiorari; cases containing cues may or may not be granted certiorari. Teger &
Kosinski, supra note 67, at 836.
83

Donald R. Songer, Concern for Policy Outputs as a Cue for Supreme Court Decisions
on Certiorari, 41 J. POL. 1185, 1187 (1979).
84

Id. at 1188.
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be more likely to vote to grant certiorari to cases decided conservatively below.85 In
that way, the “ideological direction of the lower court decision may be an error or
policy ‘cue’ and the Supreme Court may use the occasion to counter a decision of
which is disapproves ideologically.”86
The underlying concern behind an error-correction strategy is the existing status
quo policy reflected in the lower court’s opinion. Because of the time and resources
that must be devoted to those cases in which certiorari is granted, justices are more
concerned with reversing “incorrect” decisions below, than with affirming “correct”
decision below. In granting certiorari to those cases decided “incorrectly” below, the
justice is given the opportunity to vote to reverse the lower court decision, thereby
issuing a decision in congruence with his or her policy preferences. In denying
certiorari to those cases decided “correctly” below (thereby letting stand the lower
court decision), the justice’s preferred policy position is reflected in the lower court
opinion.
This simple hypothesis has been tested in a variety of ways—with the focus
being on both individual justice behavior and aggregate Court behavior. Two
themes emerge from this research—consistent support for the error-correction
hypothesis and increasing sophistication in testing it. Many initial studies examined
the effect of policy at the aggregate level, with scholars studying periods or terms of
the Court in which it could be labeled “conservative” or “liberal.” The policy cue
was deemed to be present when a liberal court, granted certiorari to a case decided
conservatively below, and vice versa.87 More recent studies have focused on
individual justice behavior and on a comparison of the status quo policy established
by the lower court decision and the likely policy that would be established by a
decision from the Court. Data supports the conclusion that justices whose preferred
ideological position is closer to the likely outcome from the Court are thus more
likely to vote to grant certiorari, believing that the Court’s final decision will more
closely resemble their personal policy preferences than the existing state of the law.88
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT
As the discussion above highlights, conflict and ideology have become necessary
components in the analysis of the Court’s certiorari behavior. To this point,
however, they have been treated as competing explanations.89 Conflict has been
viewed as representing the effect of law on certiorari behavior; ideology has been
viewed as representing the effect of policy preferences on certiorari behavior.90
More generally, the ability of conflict to explain certiorari behavior has been used to
85

Id. at 1188-89. The 1982 Supreme Court, for example, had a “decided, but certainly not
extreme, conservative ideological orientation.” Caldeira & Wright, supra note 77, at 1120.
One study concluded that “[o]ther things being equal, the [1982] Court [was] significantly
more likely to hear cases that were decided liberally in the court immediately below.” Id.
86

Armstrong & Johnson, supra note 71, at 147.

87

Songer, supra note 83, at 1185.

88

Black & Owens, supra note 12, at 1062.

89

But see id. at 1070 (arguing that the presence of conflict can both empower and
constrain justices seeking to effectuate policy goals).
90

Id.
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validate legal models of judicial behavior while the ability of ideology to explain
certiorari behavior has been used to validate extra-legal models of judicial behavior.
That this law-based approach to conflict has been taken is not surprising. Both
the Court’s own rules and the legal system’s concern for uniformity point to the
importance of conflict. In taking this legal view of conflict, the focus of much of this
work has been on whether the conflict is real and genuine or merely alleged.91 Once
a conflict is determined to be real, each conflict is treated exactly the same as any
other conflict. Such an approach allows the presence of a correlation between
conflict and certiorari grants to substitute itself for a full understanding of the
mechanism, the reason, by which conflict influences certiorari behavior. This
approach adopts the view that the explanation for this correlation must be the
adjudication of law and fails to consider any other potential alternatives. Yet,
potential alternatives exist.
As the cases involving the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act make
clear,92 the correlation between conflict and certiorari grants may indicate that
conflict can be about the resolution of competing views over policy. A conflict
among the lower courts may in fact be a cue to the Court that the lower courts
disagree about the underlying policy aspects of their decisions.93 And perhaps the
political ideology of the opposing views in the conflict, as compared to the ideology
of the Court itself, affects the Supreme Court’s decision to hear a particular case.
Take, for example, the competing policy positions presented to the Court in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.94 Harris raised competing views over the proper
standard for determining when a hostile or abusive work environment constituted a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.95 The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, along with the Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Federal
Circuits, required an employee to show a serious effect on his or her psychological
well-being or suffer injury in order to bring a hostile work environment claim.96
This side of the conflict represents a “conservative” position, in the sense that the
standard adopted made it harder for the employee’s claim against the employer to be
successful. In contract, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the Sixth
Circuit requirement and mandated that an employee need only show that a
reasonable person of the same gender as the employee would consider the conduct to
be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create
an abusive working environment.”97 The Ninth Circuit, thus, took a “liberal”
approach to this issue, because its standard made it easier for the employee’s claim
91

Caldeira & Wright, supra note 77, at 1116-17; Ulmer, supra note 5, at 904-06.

92

See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.

93

See, e.g., Frost, supra note 7, at 1591 (“When presented with ambiguous federal law,
judges in the Fourth Circuit will often adopt the more politically conservative reading and the
judges in the First and Ninth Circuits the more liberal one.”).
94

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).

95

Id. at 18-19.

96

See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986); Vance v. S. Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989); Downes v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 775
F.2d 288, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
97

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
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against the employer to be successful. In short, Harris provides a clear example of
two competing ideological “sides” in conflict.
Clearly, not all conflict is about policy.98 Similarly, however, not all conflict is
about law. When it comes to conflict, policy and law are not completely separate (the
traditional view) or completely overlapping explanations. Rather, they partially
overlap. Unless scholars understand how this overlap affects Court behavior,
inferences about the effects of both policy and law on certiorari behavior may be
incorrect.
A. Hypotheses: Political Ideology in Cases Presenting Conflict
Perhaps, given the role ideology plays in the certiorari process in general,
conflict also provide an opportunity for justices to act on their individual ideological
preferences in evaluating certiorari petitions. Do all conflict cases raise such clear
partisan implications? Of course not. But, we argue, certainly others do.
Two simple hypotheses serve as the starting point to test this argument. Both
hypotheses rely on assigning an ideological value to the Supreme Court as a whole
and to both “sides” of a conflict,99 and then comparing the relative political position
of those three entities.
The first hypothesis focuses on the ideological distance between the two
competing “sides” of the conflict—specifically, how far apart, politically, are the
two sides of the conflict represented in a cert petition. If the Court is concerned
about the policy implications of the conflicts that it reviews, we would expect it to
review those conflicts where the opposing policy positions are widely divergent—in
other words, where the two sides of the conflict are far apart on the spectrum of
ideological positions. Thus, we hypothesize that as the distance between the
political positions of the two sides of the conflict increases, the Court will be more
likely to grant certiorari.
The second hypothesis focuses on the distance between the Court and “side” of
the conflict that is furthest from it. If the Court is concerned about the policy
implications of the conflicts that it reviews, we would expect it to review those
conflicts in which one of the sides represents an outcome that is far from the Court’s
preferred policy. In other words, if one side of the conflict is ideologically very far
from the Court’s preferred policy position, then we would expect the Court to grant
certiorari to bring the overall state of law closer to its own ideological preferences.
Thus, we hypothesize that as the distance between the Court and the side that is
furthest from it increases, the Court will be more likely to grant certiorari.
B. Empirical Testing
To test these hypotheses, we reviewed cases that came before the Supreme Court
during the 1986–1994 terms. We chose these years specifically because of the
availability of cert pool memoranda,100 which were recently released to the public in
98

See, e.g., Tanenhaus et al., supra note 66, at 118 (discussing “trivial” conflicts).

99

See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.

100

The “cert pool” is an aggregation of the justices’ clerks charged with reviewing
petitions for a writ of certiorari. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. opted out of the cert pool process,
as did Justice John Paul Stevens before him. Adam Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a
Longtime Custom: The ‘Cert. Pool’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at A21. When a petition for
a writ of certiorari is filed with the Court, it is randomly assigned to one of these clerks for
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the Digital Archive of the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun.101 Our basic
approach is as follows: we identified cases that presented to the Court a certiorari
petition that alleged a conflict and we assigned an ideological “score” to each side of
the conflict and to the Supreme Court itself. Using statistical analysis, then, we were
then able to compare these ideological scores to test each of our hypotheses.
1. Data
Our data consist of cases in which a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed with
the Court and which present a conflict among the federal courts of appeals.102 For
conflict cases in which the Court granted certiorari, our data consist of a random
sample of ninety-four cases, out of a possible 296 cases, initially brought to the
Court during the 1986–1994 terms in which the Court indicated in its opinion that it
had granted certiorari in order to resolve a conflict.103 From the Supreme Court
opinions in these granted cases, we identified each of the courts of appeals cases that
the Court cited in its reasons from granting certiorari as being in conflict, and we
noted which “side” of the conflict each court of appeals case represented. In Harris,
for example, the Court’s opinion explicitly states:
We granted certiorari . . . to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on
whether conduct, to be actionable as “abusive work environment”
harassment . . . must “seriously affect [an employee's] psychological wellbeing” or lead the plaintiff to “suffe[r] injury.” Compare Rabidue
(requiring serious effect on psychological well-being); Vance v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 ([11th Cir.] 1989)
(same); and Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same),
with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-878 ([9th Cir.] 1991) (rejecting
such a requirement).104

review. The clerk writes a memorandum offering a recommended course of action for the
Court and then circulates that memorandum to the chambers of the justices participating in the
cert pool. Watts, supra note 26, at 15; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the
Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 517, 520 (2003); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE
SUPREME COURT 232-33 (Knopf ed., 2001); Owens & Simon, supra note 14, at 1226-27
(detailing the cert pool further).
101

Lee Epstein et al., Digital Archive of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://epstein.usc.edu/blackmun.php; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and
Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933,
934 (2009).
102

We ignored cases presenting conflicts with state courts because we lack the necessary
information on state court judge ideology to conduct our analysis.
103
We recognize the limitation in relying only on whether the Court states that it granted
cert to resolve a conflict. This approach potentially undercounts the number of conflicts
actually resolved by the Court. In future research, we plan to use the cert pool memoranda
provided in the archives of Justice Blackmun’s papers to more completely identify this
population since the cert pool memorandum typically indicates if a conflict is present.
104

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993).
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From this language, we identified one side of the conflict as consisting of the
Sixth Circuit (the Rabidue case), the Eleventh Circuit, and the Federal Circuit. The
Ninth Circuit represents the other side of the conflict.
For conflict cases in which the Court denied certiorari, our data consist of a
sample of thirty-nine cases, out of a possible 295 cases, initially brought to the Court
during the 1986–1993 terms in which Justice White indicated his dissent from the
denial of certiorari.105 For these denied cases, we reviewed the cert pool
memorandum to identify which courts of appeals the memo cited as being in conflict
and which side of the conflict those cases represent.
We then collected information from the lower court opinions, including
information on the identity and votes of the judges involved and the lower court’s
disposition of the case. In some instances this process resulted in coding, or
gathering data from, two lower court opinions (i.e. the Court or cert pool memo
merely noted that lower court opinion A conflicts with lower court opinion B); in
some instances this resulted in the coding of thirteen lower court opinions (i.e. the
Court or the cert pool memo cited opinions from each of the thirteen courts of
appeals reflecting the conflict).106 In total, for the certiorari granted cases, we coded
information from 374 courts of appeals cases, an average of 3.98 lower court cases
for each Supreme Court opinion; for the certiorari denied cases, we coded
information from 165 courts of appeals cases, an average of 4.23 lower court cases
for each cert pool memorandum.
2. Ideology Score
To examine conflict as an ideological variable, we need some measure of where a
particular “side” from a given case sits in policy space relative to the other “side.” If
we can think of lower court cases as presenting, as Harris demonstrates,107
competing “sides” of a policy debate, then we can begin to identify where the rule of
law adopted by each of these lower courts is located by examining the side of the
conflict on which each court sits.
As noted above, in reviewing Supreme Court opinions and cert pool memoranda,
we recorded which side of the conflict the Court or the cert pool memo indicated
each lower court opinion represented. Such a statement from the Court and the cert
pool memo is typical in conflict cases. In granted cases, the final opinion from the
Court not only provides citations to the lower court opinions in conflict, but also
clearly identifies which lower courts it thinks are in agreement or disagreement with
one another.108 In denied cases, a careful reading of the cert pool memorandum
delineates which lower courts the clerk thinks are in agreement or disagreement with
each other.
105
We adopt this approach because of Justice White’s focus, throughout his tenure on the
Court, on conflicts among the courts of appeals. See Owens & Simon, supra note 14, at 126970. Thus, of all the justices, Justice White was most often prone to issue dissents from the
denial of certiorari due to his view that a conflict existed which the Court was refusing to
resolve. See Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of
Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 705 (1995).
106

We ignored any citations to state supreme court cases.

107

See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.

108

See, e.g., infra note 109 and accompanying text (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17 (1993)).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012

19

578

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:559

To develop a measure of the ideological position of each side, we assumed a onedimensional liberal-conservative (left-right) spectrum. Obviously, we cannot simply
assign each lower court opinion a location on this left-right dimension. Instead, our
measure of the location on the spectrum was derived from the Judicial Common
Space (JCS)109 methodology. The JCS places justices of the Supreme Court110 and
judges of the courts of appeals111 on the same one-dimensional, liberal-conservative
scale.112 The scores range from -1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative),113 and “[t]he result is
a score that can be compared directly across institutions and over time.”114 Thus,
“[e]mpirical legal scholars have employed these scores across the board.”115
For the lower court opinions, we assigned to each opinion an ideology score
equal to the JCS score of the judge who authored the opinion. Although courts of
appeals cases typically are decided in three-judge panels, we use the authoring
judge’s JCS score for a couple of reasons. First, this judge typically retains the most
control over the content of the lower court’s opinion. Moreover, viewed from the
Supreme Court’s perspective, it is the identity of the authoring judge that most
quickly and efficiently provides a cue for the justices reviewing the lower
decision.116
In situations where the Supreme Court or cert pool memo cited only one lower
court case as representing a particular side of a conflict, the location on the
ideological spectrum of that side is represented by the JCS score of the judge who
authored the cited lower court opinion. In situations where the Supreme Court or
cert pool memo cited more than one lower court case as representing a particular

109

See generally Lee Epstein et al, The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303
(2007) (introducing the Judicial Common Space measurement scale).
110
Supreme Court justices are assigned a JCS score based on “a vote-based measure of
Supreme Court ideology developed by [political scientists Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M.
Quinn in 2002].” Id. at 306; see also id. at 307 (“These ‘Martin-Quinn’ scores, which are
available for all justices in all terms from 1937 to 2003 . . . are derived from voting patterns on
the Supreme Court.”) .
111

JSC scores for courts of appeals judges are based on the notion of “senatorial courtesy.”

If a judge is appointed from a state where the President and at least one home-state
Senator are of the same party, the nominee is assigned the . . . score of the home-state
Senator (or the average of the home-state Senators if both members of the delegation
are from the President’s party). If neither home-state Senator is of the President’s
party, the nominee receives the . . . score of the appointing President.
Id. at 306.
112

Similar common space scores are also available for presidents and members of
Congress. Owens & Simon, supra note 14, at 1273.
113

Epstein et al., supra note 109, at 309-10.

114

Owens & Simon, supra note 14, at 1274.

115

Id.

116

Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a
Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 109-10 (2000).
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side of a conflict, the location of that side is represented by the mean JCS score of all
of the judges authoring the cited lower court opinions.
For the Supreme Court’s ideological position, we use the JCS score of the
median justice on the Court in the prior term. Thus, taken together, we have
measures of the Court median and the two “sides” of the conflict for 133 conflicts
cases that were brought to the Court on a petition for a writ of certiorari. And all of
these measures—the scores for the Court and the sides of the conflict—are on the
same JCS scale, enabling direct comparison among them.
Figure 1: Ideological Position of Circuits and Supreme Court, Conflict Cases.

Figure 1 displays these measures for the first forty of the ninety-four conflict
cases in which certiorari was granted and all of the thirty-nine conflict cases for
which certiorari was denied. The vertical line on each dotted horizontal line
represents the Supreme Court’s LCS score, its ideological position on a -1 to 1 scale,
based on the median justice of the prior term. The squares mark the JCS score of the
more liberal side of the circuit split, and the triangle denotes the JCS score of the
more conservative side, both calculated as an average of the JCS scores of the
authoring judges of opinion on that side of the split.
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C. Analysis and Discussion of Hypothesis One
Recall that our first hypothesis focused on how far apart, ideologically, the two
sides of a conflict were. We suggested that if the Court were concerned about
conflict from a policy standpoint, it would be more likely to grant certiorari as the
distance between the policy positions of the two sides of the conflict increased.
Figure 2 shows the results of our tests for this first hypothesis.
Figure 2: Ideological Distance Between Circuit Split Sides.

Figure 2 includes three separate histograms, each indicating the number of
certiorari petitions the court received based on the ideological distance between the
sides of the circuit split. The horizontal axis of each histogram is the distance
between the ideological score of the two sides of the conflict, and the vertical axis is
a count of how many petitions included a conflict with that divide.
The top histogram shows the distribution between the two sides to the conflict for
all of the cases in our data set. The middle histogram shows the same distribution
for the cases where the Court granted certiorari. And the bottom histogram shows
the distribution between the sides of the conflict in cases where the Court denied
certiorari. The thick vertical line represents the mean distance between sides of the
conflict for each category.
There is a marked difference between the shapes of the distributions for the
granted and denied conflicts, which supports our hypothesis. As the distance
between the sides of the conflict increases (approaches 1), the Court is more likely to
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grant certiorari. The bottom histogram of denied petitions shows far fewer cases
with a wider split than the granted cases. Conversely, the denied petitions include
far more cases with a narrow split—a smaller ideological difference between the two
sides of the conflict. Moreover, the mean distance between the sides of the granted
conflicts (0.361) is greater than the mean distance (0.280) between the sides of the
denied conflicts, a difference that is statistically significant.117
D. Analysis and Discussion of Hypothesis Two
Our second hypothesis focused on the position of the Court relative to the sides
of the conflict. Specifically, we suggested that if the Court were concerned about
conflict from a policy standpoint, it would be more likely to grant certiorari as the
distance between the Court and one side of the conflict increased. Figure 3 shows
the results of our tests for this second hypothesis.
Figure 3: Maximum Distance Between Circuit Split Side and Supreme Court.

Figure 3 includes three separate histograms, each showing the number of cert
petitions the Court received based on the distance between the Court and the side of
117

A simple one-tailed t-test indicates that this difference is statistically significant at the
0.05 level (p=0.039).
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the conflict that is farthest from it. The horizontal axis of each histogram is the
distance between the ideological score of the Court and the side of the conflict that is
farthest from it, and the vertical axis is a count of how many petitions included a
distance of that magnitude.
The top histogram shows the distribution between the Court and the “side” of the
conflict that is the farthest from it for all the conflicts in our data. The middle and
bottom histograms show that the distribution of this distance for granted and denied
cases. And again, the thick vertical line is the mean distance for each category of
petitions.
Once again, there is a difference between the shapes of the distributions for the
granted and denied conflicts, but the difference is less dramatic. Granted conflicts
appear to more often reflect a greater distance between the Court and the far side of
the conflict; granted conflicts include far more petitions where the distance
approaches 1. Moreover, the mean distance between the Court and the far side of the
conflict in granted conflicts (0.369) is greater than the mean distance (0.326)
between the Court and the far side of the conflict in denied conflicts. The difference
between these two means is markedly smaller than in the analysis for the first
hypothesis, and this difference fails to achieve statistically significant.118
E. Discussion of Empirical Analyses
The analysis presented in this study sheds new light on the role lower court
conflict plays in influencing the Supreme Court’s certiorari decisions. Conflict has
long been recognized as being important in the certiorari process, but the above
analysis shows that it is more important to Court decision-making than has been
previously recognized. This study provides evidence that the ideological content of
lower court conflict provides informational clues to justices that influence their
decisions to grant certiorari, which is particularly important as the Court works it
way through the thousands of certiorari petitions it receives each year. The data
show that the ideologies of lower court justices can influence Supreme Court
certiorari decision.
Consistent with hypothesis one, when the justices on the two sides of a circuit
split have distinct ideological differences, cases are more likely to be heard by the
Court. The differences in lower court ideologies are significantly higher in the cases
granted cert than in the cases denied cert. This phenomenon indicates that the Court
is using what it knows about the ideologies of lower court justices to help it identify
cases where the conflict in the law is the greatest and where resolution by the
Supreme Court is the most needed. Cases that show stark ideological difference
between the sides of a split are likely to represent areas of the law where current law
is the most unsettled and where the greatest policy difference between circuits are
likely to lie. The ideological content of conflict cases provides the Supreme Court
with a useful informational tool that allows justices to identify the conflict cases that
most need the Court’s attention.
Hypothesis two argues that the ideological content of conflict cases provides the
Supreme Court with a way to identify cases where the lower courts are issuing
rulings that are the farthest away from the Supreme Court’s ideological preferences.
This allows the Court to identify and then correct “errors” made by lower courts.
118

A simple one-tailed t-test indicates that this difference is not statistically significant at
the 0.05 level (p=0.067).
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The empirical evidence provides only the weakest of support for this hypothesis.
While cases where the ideological differences between the Supreme Court and at
least one side of a conflict are highest are slightly more likely to be granted
certiorari, the effect is small. The Court may occasionally consider its policy
preferences relative to those of lower court preferences when accepting cases for
review, but the Court does not appear to be doing so consistently. These results,
taken together, indicate that the Court is using the ideological information about
lower court justices to help identify the conflict cases most in need of resolution, but
is not consistently using this information to further its own policy preferences.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we argued in favor of an examination of the long-held assumption
in the literature on the Court’s certiorari behavior that conflict in the lower courts is a
purely legal concept and nothing else. Clearly, case examples exist that demonstrate
the need for this examination. In some cases, like Harris and the recent case
involving the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, conflict appears to be
about more than just a dispute over the proper legal rule to be applied to a given set
of facts. Our results, though limited in nature by the number of cases from which we
collected data, indicate some support for our hypotheses.
Future research and statistical analysis can only enhance this conversation. Does,
for example, the depth or strength of the conflict in terms of the number of courts of
appeals having issued the decision affect the likelihood of the Court’s grant of
certiorari? We hope to continue to explore this and other questions with additional
data collection and continued research and analysis.
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